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Abstract In the context of debates on (forensic) psy-
chiatry issues pertaining to moral dimensions of
(forensic) psychiatric health care are frequently
discussed. These debates invite reflection on the ques-
tion whether forensic practitioners have a role in stimu-
lating patients’moral development and moral growth in
the context of forensic psychiatric and psychological
treatment and care. We conducted a qualitative study
to examine to what extent forensic practitioners consider
moral development and moral growth to be a part of
their current professional practices and to what extent
they think that stimulating moral development is a le-
gitimate objective in the context of forensic psychiatric
treatment. In addition, we asked how forensic
practitioners balance pubic safety and risk management
concerns with the interests and wellbeing of the individ-
ual patient. We conclude that: (i) elements of moral
development and moral growth in forensic psychiatric
care practices are to a certain extent inevitable and not
necessarily questionable or undesirable; (ii) yet, as in
similar debates these elements need to be made explicit
in order to discuss the accompanying ethical challenges
and boundaries. An open academic, professional and
public debate on aspects of stimulatingmoral betterment
within current practices is therefore desirable.
Keywords Moral enhancement . Moral
bioenhancement . Forensic mental health . Dual role
dilemma .Moral development
Introduction
A number of separate debates invite reflection on the
question whether forensic practitioners have a role in
stimulating patients’ moral development and moral
growth in the context of forensic psychiatric and psy-
chological treatment and care.
Psychiatrist Sean Spence has raised the question
whether moral improvement (in the sense of being a
better person, or a better behaving person) is an implicit,
or even explicit, goal of psychiatric treatment: BCan
pharmacology help us enhance human morality? (...) I
argue that we are already deploying certain medications
in a way not totally dissimilar to the foregoing proposal:
whenever humans knowingly use drugs as a means to
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improving their future conduct.^ [1]. Apart from the –
what Spence calls – ‘Promethean project’ of
Bspecifically designing drugs that target and increase a
pro-social feeling and behaviour such as ‘kindness’^
[1], treatment can have morally relevant side-effects or
consequences. Spence discusses the example of Ba man
prone to psychosis, who can be violent when ill, takes
his medication reliably, thereby reducing his risk to
others)^ [1]. Here, Spence argues, the well-being of
others has improved as a direct result of pharmacolog-
ical treatment of a mental disorder. A number of com-
mentators have discussed potentially morally relevant
Bside-effects^ of existing drugs that may (or already)
have altering effects on moral decision making or on
morally significant behaviour, and urgemore research to
able to better distinguish between desirable and less
desirable effects [2, 3]. One example discussed by the
authors concerns selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) that are prescribed to treat depression and anx-
iety disorders, but as a possible side-effect may increase
aversion to directly causing harm in others [4].
Psychiatrist Steve Pearce and philosopher Hanna
Pickard make a similar point when they argue that
psychiatric treatment can foster moral growth in various
ways: BFirst, they can lead to the emergence of new
moral motives and intentions. Second, they can lead to
the acquisition or development of cognitive skills such
as empathy, which are central planks of moral action.
Third, they can enhance the ability to apply moral
understanding and skills in particular circumstances^
[5]. They take it as a given that interventions that can
foster moral growth occur routinely within psychiatric
settings, most notably in the treatment of personality
disorders. In this context the question is posed as to
whether forensic psychiatric disorders should partly be
understood as moral disorders, and forensic psychiatric
treatment as moral therapy. Diagnostic criteria for per-
sonality disorders involve traits that involve failings of
morality or virtue, such as lack of empathy in the case of
narcissistic personality disorder, or anger and impulsiv-
ity in the case of borderline personality disorder [5, 6].
Pickard has discussed this in terms of the inherent
‘Janus-faced nature’ of personality disorders (PD): BThe
fact that the characteristics and traits that cause distress
and impairment to the individual often involve harm to
others. (…) Although harm to others, broadly con-
ceived, is not part of the DSM-IV-TR definition of PD,
it is part of how particular kinds of PD are diagnosed:
via characteristics or traits that count as failures
of morality or virtue and thus impair social, occupation-
al, or other areas of interpersonal functioning.^ [6].1
In sum, in the context of debates on (forensic) psy-
chiatry issues pertaining to moral dimensions of
(forensic) psychiatric care are frequently discussed. Al-
though some experts have argued that moral betterment
is or should be a goal within forensic psychiatry and
psychology practices [5], it is unclear to what extent
stimulating moral development and moral growth is a
goal within current forensic mental health settings and
much less so whether it should be.
In this article, we explicitly focus on questions related
to the moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric practice.
The main objective of this study is to explore the ques-
tion whether forensic practitioners consider stimulating
moral development and moral growth to be a part of
their current professional practices, and to what extent
they think that stimulating moral development is a le-
gitimate objective in the context of forensic psychiatric
treatment. In addition, we ask how forensic practitioners
balance public safety and risk management concerns
with the interests and wellbeing of the individual pa-
tient. In the discussion, we discuss whether, and of so in
what ways, our findings relate to and can be informative
for the bioethical debate on moral bioenhancement.
Methods
Sample and Recruitment
We recruited 21 forensic practitioners (forensic psychi-
atrists, clinical psychologists and therapists) in
The Netherlands and in Belgium. Subjects were recruit-
ed via professional organizations and by snowball sam-
pling, meaning that initial research subjects suggested
potential future subjects from their network [9]. Our
sample consists of nine females and 13 males, ranging
in age from 32 to 68 years. At the time of the interviews,
12 participants were employed in The Netherlands and
nine were employed in Belgium.
We conducted 11 interviews with forensic psychia-
trists (FP) (at the time of the interview, one participant
1 See also: Bwrongfulness-laden disorders should be investigated to
determine whether the disorder involves a moral incapacity (a disabil-
ity in the moral sphere or Bfaculty^) or is simply a matter of wrongful
moral choice^ [7]; and Bsome psychopaths do, in fact, appear to have
deficits that distinguish them from responsible offenders. These deficits
appear to undermine psychopaths’ ability to understand morality^ [8].
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worked as a general psychiatrist, but had worked in
forensic settings in the past). We conducted 10 inter-
views with clinical psychologists (CP) or therapists (T)
(at the time of the interview, two participants - a therapist
and a clinical psychologist - were primarily involved in
research and did not consult patients, but had done so in
the past). Twelve participants (seven psychiatrists and
five psychologists) are involved in scientific research,
alongside their clinical or therapeutic work.
Qualitative Interviews
Participants took part in an individual semi-structured
interview lasting approximately one hour. During one
interview, two respondents were present and
interviewed together. The interviews were held in Bel-
gium and The Netherlands, and took place between
January 2014 and July 2016. The interview guide was
developed by JS in consultation with MS, FF and SS.
The interviews were conducted by JS, FF and MS. JS
attended 17 interviews, FF attended seven interviews,
and MS attended three interviews.
The interview schedule included open-ended ques-
tions about the moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric
practice, about participants’ views on the question
whe the r they cons ide r s t imu la t ing Bmora l
improvement^ or Bmoral development^ part of their
current work practise and as a legitimate part of their
professional responsibilities, and about how to balance
and prioritize public safety and risk management con-
cerns with the interests and wellbeing of patients. The
interview schedule also contained a separate part with
questions on forensic practitioners’ expectations and
moral views regarding potential applications of current
neurobiological and behavioural genetic research
aiming to understand (and possibly help prevent, con-
tain, or treat) violent and antisocial behaviour. We have
reported on that topic elsewhere [10].
Coding
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded in
QSR NVivo version 11, using descriptive theme analy-
sis [11]. All transcripts were independently read by all
members of the research team (JS, FF, MS, SS). All
transcripts were independently read by all members of
the research team (JS, FF, MS, SS). JS and FF discussed
a random selection of transcripts with the purpose of
drafting a preliminary analytic framework. JS
independently coded the transcripts by labelling sec-
tions and text units referring to one or multiple concepts
relevant for the study purpose. An iterative approach
was used in which new data that challenged the existing
coding structure were used to revise the themes until no
new themes emerged. Interpretative bias of data was
avoided by means of investigator triangulation, which
involved all researchers (JS, FF, MS, SS) checking the
codes for consistency.
Results
Do Stimulating Moral Development and Moral Growth
Play a Role in Treatment?
The first set of questions offered to participants raised
the – deliberately broadly formulated – issue of whether
forensic psychiatric treatment and care involve, in one
way or another, elements of stimulating moral develop-
ment and moral growth. In their responses, participants
did not only differ in their opinion on whether these
elements should or shouldn’t be part of treatment, but
also in their understanding of what morality entails.
Nearly all participants started their response with
discussing how to understand moral development and
moral growth, and what kind ofmorally relevant aspects
are, or potentially can be, targeted in treatment. Before
outlining the different aspects of morality participants
mentioned in the subsequent section, below we discuss
the reasons participants offered why they do or do not
think stimulating moral development and moral growth
is part of treatment.
Whereas only a few participants indicated that stimu-
latingmoral development andmoral growth were not part
of treatment, most participants appeared to be more am-
bivalent in their answers. Participants who indicated that
stimulatingmoral development andmoral growth play no
role in treatment, mentioned that their treatment plans do
not involve aspects of stimulating moral development,
and that their medical training did not involve a focus on
the moral aspects of behaviour. Instead, they underlined
their medical rather than ‘moral’ expertise. This can be
illustrated with the following quote from a participant:
Look, our task is not to create ‘better people’. We
want them to stop doing awful things, we want to
lower the risk factors, and I think that, to create
better people, that is a very big step. CP8
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If someone says to me; ‘Generally, I’m quickly
aroused, high in blood so to say (…) And then I
feel rejected very soon’, if I can improve that in
any way, in how he relates to higher values and the
world surrounding him, by intervening by giving
him a beta blocker, for example, to make sure he is
less quickly aroused – I will do that. But my goal
is to increase his quality of life, my goal is not to
improve someone’s morality. Because, I actually
think that that does not belong to my expertise, to
my profession, and is actually not part of my
assignment. FP1
A number of participants argued that stimulating moral
development or moral growth should not be part of
treatment, and emphasized the importance of maintain-
ing a clinical stance towards their patients, if only to
provide a safe place to discuss sensitive subjects. They
argued that the primary task of a forensic psychiatrists or
therapist should be to treat disorders and to improve the
quality of life of their patients – not to moralize – and
that moral condemnation and judgment, if applicable,
should happen not in the consulting room, but elsewhere
(in court for example, or perhaps in society at large).
I do not like the idea that this would be a required
task of a forensic psychiatrist. I think, I can only
speak for myself, I think, well, we are not to judge
about good and evil. I mean, we can only observe.
And the only thing we are trained to do is to see if
we can find a way to improve the quality of life of
patients, preferably in a holistic way. And that is
the only thing we can do, anything else, we can-
not. FP1
Is it the aim for psychologists to become priests?
To become moralists? Please, no. There must be a
place for someone, who of course is condemned
everywhere else within society, to find shelter and
to not be judged. If such a place is no longer
available (…) that person will no longer dare to
share her most immoral thoughts. CP6
And by the way, who am I to lecture that person?
Because presumably they would be able to men-
tion a few things they disapprove of about me,
right? PF5
However, other participants indicated that moral devel-
opment is indeed part of forensic psychiatric treatment.
These participants often mentioned that they considered
improving patients’ capacities for empathy (both
cognitive and affective) and moral reasoning (in terms
of correcting cognitions and logical errors) as explicit
treatment goals.
Empathy, for example, is certainly a goal for us.We
focus on impulse control, relapse prevention, em-
pathy enhancement, and responsabilization. CP4
Very often with people who do not behave moral-
ly, I feel it is about logical errors. And then I try –
but I am necessarily limited in this regard – I try to
determine whether there are any thinking errors
involved, and whether I can test their flawed ways
of thinking, and possibly correct or adjust them,
pharmacologically or psychotherapeutically. FP1
Interestingly, as the interviews progressed, several par-
ticipants kept coming back to this subject and wondered
whether, even though moral development is not an
explicit treatment goal, this might be an implicit part
of forensic treatment:
However, as far as I am concerned, not to change
him as a person, no. In the sense of trying to
impose a certain kind of moral awareness, no.
Interviewer: That is not one of the goals of
treatment?
Interviewee: No. Not explicitly, and perhaps also not
implicitly, but I’m not entirely sure about that. FP8
In this context, several participants referred to the inher-
ently normsetting and prescriptive nature of their pro-
fession and the challenge of not placing one’s own
moral convictions and moral values at center. Partici-
pants thus appeared hesitant to moralize, but at the same
time discussed that to a certain extent, this might also be
inevitable:
Well, at least I think many psychiatrists, unknow-
ingly, very much approach and also treat their
patients on the basis of a certain moral idea, that
is, with their own norms, values, and morality,
which simply pervades everything you’re trying
to convey to your patients. So implicitly I would
certainly agree. I think explicitly, also - many peo-
ple, hm… Well, to provide a very concrete exam-
ple, we offer a training that consists of three parts:
social skills, emotion regulation, and moral reason-
ing.Moral reasoning is about casuistry: ‘What does
this mean for the other?; What do you do merely
for your own advantage?; What if this would
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happen to you?’. So in training, for example, we do
call it, ‘to learn to reason better morally’. So appar-
ently we have some kind of idea about what good
moral reasoning is, and apparently it is also some-
thing we want to teach. FP10
Coming from general psychiatry, it does indeed
strike me that, the, hm, the moral framework is
implicitly present – much more than outside of
forensic psychiatry. It is not made explicit, but it
does play a role. If you would put it bluntly: ‘To
what extent do we want the people whom we are
treating here to be good citizens?’ Yes, I’m afraid
that it does, that it does play a role beneath the
surface, but that we do not talk about it. On a
superficial level, we aim to make sure that people
no longer pose a risk, or as little risk as possible to
themselves or others. But of course that has a very
strong moral component. So, yes: it plays a big
role. And no: it is not expressed as such. FP8
So it is not my job to socialize people. Although
somehow it is, but I will never say this out loud,
because otherwise people will interpret socializing
as re-educating, in the sense of ‘becoming like us’. I
embrace a socialization that takes place fromwithin
a subject’s own coordinates. If someone regains a
place within society – without necessarily actively
participating in society, but also without wandering
and suffering; if someone is able to make life
bearable for himself/oneself, in a very discrete
manner, without experiencing others as threatening
and so forth – that for me is already a successful
socialization. Whether others will share that per-
spective? The prevailing norms of others claiming
that a normal individual should be like this or like
that. I don’t care about such norms. As long as that
person no longer poses a physical threat to others or
to himself, that’s okay for me. Regardless of what
that person is like at that time. CP6
Participants describe how particular patients and types
of offences can elicit moral outrage or even abhorrence,
and stress the importance of a clinical stance or attitude
in order to overcome or distance themselves from these
negative emotions. Some reflect on the ways their pro-
fession has forced them to reflect on their own moral
framework and commitments.
And of course, I experience these thoughts as
well: BCome here, you boor, and I will beat you
up^. Apparently, that is part of us as human
beings. But then I realize that this would satisfy
my own frustration more than anything else. FP3
That subcategory evokes repugnance in almost
everyone. And the difficult thing is – and that is
true for medicine generally of course – that we are
trying to disconnect this from the disorder. So we
see pedosexual offenders primarily as people with
a problem, with a disorder that we should help
them to get rid of as much as possible. And in
interactions with patients, the moral dimension is
not addressed, right? So you never say to some-
one; BWhat a horrible thing you have done!^ FP8
What Aspects of Human Morality Do Forensic
Practitioners Deem Relevant for Treatment?
In their responses, participants identified and reflected
on various aspects of human morality that are, or poten-
tially can be, targeted by treatment: patients’ remorse,
conscience, or guilt; self-regulation and self-awareness;
motivation and will to change; moral responsibility;
capacities for moral reasoning; and moral emotions
(such as empathy). Participants differed in the way they
conceptualized morality, and in what they understand
morality to be. Whereas some focused more on capac-
ities to be moral (such as having the capacity to empa-
thize with others, or to reflect on one’s own behaviour),
others focused on more symbolic elements, such as
restoration with society.
With respect to expressing regret and restoration
and such things: a chance of recovery, a bond with
the victim, restoring the bond with his own family
(because they are affected as well), restoration with
society – these are things we certainly address. CP4
Interviewer: BSo morality is not addressed at all in
treatment?^
Interviewee: BYes, it is, but not in terms of morality,
but in terms of reciprocity. To the extent that one
can build a reciprocal relationship with someone
and is capable to handle and sustain that relation-
ship and to anticipate the other’s position, and best-
case scenario even to mentalize it. And that he is
able to take the position of the other.^ FP11
One of the aspects that participants deemed especcially
relevant in the context of treatment and that was men-
tioned frequently concerns self-awareness and the ca-
pacity and will to control oneself.
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You teach people to analyze themselves. You offer
a kind of frame to pay attention to what they think,
feel, and do. Also in the case of sexual offenders.
To make them aware of the kinds of things they
tell themselves when they start to commit and
continue to engage in an offence, what they tell
themselves while they are doing it, and what they
tell themselves afterwards, to be able to say that it
wasn’t that bad. And so on. So we actually give
people such grids and tools to get to know them-
selves better and to pay attention to feelings and
thoughts and actions that they did not pay atten-
tion to before, and without being fully aware, they
would proceed to commit a crime. FP2
Really, it is inhibition that is actually our core
business. You try to teach these people to keep
that under control. CP7
To get a chance to, well, create a motivation, the
will to control oneself. CP7
Many participants raised the question ofwhether focussing
on one aspect or capacity would accomplish a genuine
improvement in the sense of someone being ‘a genuinely
better person’. For example, several participants reflected
on whether it is enough for someone to stop a particular
behaviour, for example by enhancing inhibition, without
accompanying changes in beliefs or thought patterns.
If someone says, ‘I will not perform that behaviour
anymore,’ then you could say that, because of that,
you have become a better person, right? CP7
In the core? I don’t know. It is also possible, you
may also have a different motive to stop doing it.
To prevent relapse, in your own interest. CP8
I will quote Freud here: We are all rapists and
thugs in the depths of our thoughts, but the bad
ones are those who act on them, and the good ones
are those who think about it, but don’t act. FP9
Several participants discussed responsibility as an im-
portant part of forensic psychiatric treatment. Both in the
sense of looking back (I was the one who did these
things) and in the sense of looking forward (I need to
make changes in order to prevent myself from doing the
same thing again). Several practitioners stressed that,
frequently, the first is needed to achieve the second:
As long as patients say ‘I could not do anything
about it’, I will tell them: ‘Well, yes, if you really
couldn’t, if you really feel that it was because the
sun was shining or it was raining, you could not do
anything about it, that it was the weather; well,
then you cannot go outside, can you? That must be
terrible; it could happen to you tomorrow again,
couldn’t it?’ Well, of course they do not think
along those lines. (…) But when framed like that,
that’s not what they want for themselves. So we
need to address what’s possible. ‘Well, then we do
have to figure out what you can do about it. For all
I care, you bring both your umbrella and your
sunglasses, to make sure that you… But you must
address it.’ T2
Even very seriously disordered people are, at a
certain level, accountable. And that also makes it
possible to achieve progress with them, do you
understand? That’s the space you need of course,
because if you have the extreme, ‘I cannot do
anything about it’ – yes, and then what? FP5
That has to do with giving responsibility. Because
it is you who makes that choice, despite the feel-
ings you may have; you are the one who makes
the choice to act. CP8
Nevertheless, several practitioners expressed reserva-
tions with respect to the importance of addressing re-
sponsibility in treatment. For example, because behav-
iour change is far more difficult to achieve than was
once thought, and this places limits on the degree to
which moral development can be addressed in treat-
ment. Many participants discussed the degree to which
you can hold people accountable for past behaviour, for
example because of societal and situational factors, or
expressed a more general skepticism with respect to
human free will.
I have been working in this field for thirty years of
course, the forensic field. And I started at a time
when we were thinking very much about ‘Mallea-
ble Man’. A period in which self-regulation and
free will were values that we were holding dear.
And of course, over the course of time, that opti-
mism has diminished, with all the consequences
that this entails. So we were thinking, when I
started more than thirty years ago, that as long as
people would be willing, and we would be moti-
vating and stimulating them, they would move in
the right direction. And now with developments,
also neurobiological developments, you think that
there is more to it than simply the idea: as long as
you want to, you will succeed. CP1
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My belief in free will is limited. If you observe
those boys – and I’ve really seen hundreds, also
intensively – they are almost all friendly fools who
fell victim to their own life, their own environ-
ment, their upbringing, their lack of intelligence,
and so on. FP3
I would say: I take human free will as a starting
point. That is, ultimately, a hypothesis, a subjec-
tive truth, yes. (…) But also for the court it is a
basic starting point: it’s assumed that people are
responsible for what they do, what they think, and
so on, for their actions, until the opposite is prov-
en. FP2
How Do Forensic Practitioners’ Balance the Wellbeing
of the Patient with Public Safety Concerns?
Why would stimulating moral development and moral
growth in fact be part of forensic treatment? Many
participants stressed that their primary objective is to
lower the risk that someone will harm others.
That is a problem we have with sexual delin-
quents: that the bodily integrity of others is poten-
tially in danger. (…) If I treat a serial rapist, I
cannot say: ‘He relapsed, but that is already an
improvement, because nothing happened in the
three months before.’ FP2
But within this profession, I always say to pa-
tients: ‘You can remain as crazy as you are now,
I am not saying that you have to change at all. I
just need to change this one thing, that is, that you
will never do it again.’ T2
In contrast, several participants indicated that stimulat-
ing moral development may be part of treatment, when
it can help to manage stress relief or to reduce the
suffering of the patient. Several participants conceptual-
ized this as an ‘egocentric perspective’, in that they try to
refer to the patient’s interests.
Moral outrage about paedophiles etcera that’s,
that’s very intense in society. Society demands
that we do something about it. But the moment
I… Opportunities to work with these people will
not grow the moment I start talking about moral-
ity. Perhaps when I talk with them about empa-
thizing with victims – maybe you could classify
that under that heading?Which is of course part of
the treatment of sexual offences. To empathize.
But you empathize with the other, in order to
enhance your own inhibition. It is not about feel-
ing sorry for those people – do you understand
that? The victim, that is merely, that is actually
only just, actually only just instrumental for the
patient himself. The more you empathize, the
more the resistance grows, the resistance to act
on it. FP5
But what I can say is that if someone, because of
his moral deficiencies so to say, gets in to a lot of
trouble with his environment, and if he is rejected
a lot, and because of that is acting very hostile, and
so on – I will point out that mechanism to him.
And I would say to him, ‘I would advise you to do
some tests, to take a look at what we can do,
maybe that will help.’ Yes, that I will do. FP1
Some participants characterized stimulating specific
morally relevant aspects as a means rather than a goal;
moral development may help achieve some other goal
of forensic psychiatric treatment (such as lowering re-
cidivism), but it is not an end in itself.
BI would say, it is a collateral advantage^ CP1
These different potential objectives of stimulating moral
development and moral growth – a focus on safety and
harm reduction to protect others versus a focus on the
patients’wellbeing and treatment goals - are mirrored in
two different sets of professional roles and responsibil-
ities of forensic practitioners: on the one hand their
medical background as doctors, and on the other hand
their responsibilities regarding public safety. We asked
participants in our study to reflect on these roles and
potential tensions between them, and to indicate which
of the two, if any, they consider primary.
In general, most participants acknowledged both re-
sponsibilities. They differed however, in their views on
which of these professional roles they considered pri-
mary. Whereas some participants explicitly positioned
themselves as a medical doctor first, most participants
also stressed their responsibilities in preventing harmful
crimes from being performed again.
If I would have to choose, I would be inclined to
favor the protection of society, because the civil
commitment of one disturbed forensic patient can
prevent the victimization of several victims. FP9
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If we would make a list of the ten things we are
doing here, that would be number one: No new
victims. And this is also clearly defined in terms of
professional secrecy. We have professional secre-
cy pertaining to all, everything that is discussed
here, until we estimate that there is a real danger
with an identifiable future victim. CP4
I think the task of forensic psychiatry is, primarily,
to minimize recidivism. That’s really primary, be-
cause that makes the profession what it is. That
doesn’t mean I am blind to people’s suffering of
course, but that is primary, that is absolutely par-
amount. And then, hm, I would say, secondly, can
I, can we maybe, make people suffer less, have
fewer problems, improve their quality of life. Also
for their environment, I think that is often forgot-
ten; for the children and for family members, that
is very important. (…) That is the system within
which we operate, and that also allows the patient
a certain degree of autonomy. FP5
Several participants discussed various tensions between,
on the one hand, their medical responsibilities, and, on
the other hand, public safety concerns.
Sometimes these people experience profound suf-
fering. Sometimes there is no suffering. Those are
fundamentally different situations. (…) To put it
bluntly, someone who does want help in
preventing making the same mistakes again, and
someone who refuses that help – you do have
different options available. FP6
Youmust adhere to the rules of medicine. And that
is a danger, I think, for forensic psychiatrists.
Actually, that is a danger in many disciplines in
which you specialize, that you have to think care-
fully where you came from, where your founda-
tions lie, to not stray from one’s subject field. (…)
Because a forensic psychiatrist is first and fore-
most a doctor. And must also work from those
foundations, and according to the oath and princi-
ples of proportionality and subsidiarity. FP6
Some participants offered pragmatic rather than princi-
pled arguments for not focusing too much on future risk
in treatment:
Yes, both of course. But when it comes to initiating
and achieving successful forensic treatment, I don’t
think that the focus should be on that risk. Because
if you want to motivate people for their own treat-
ment, because that is necessary for treatment suc-
cess, you have to start from their own suffering.
And sometimes, that is a different suffering than
how society sees it, but that needs to be the starting
point for treatment. Because otherwise, you will
not have any commitment of your clients. CP2
Several participants drew parallels with regular psychi-
atry, where their medical expertise and authority solely
function within a therapeutic care setting, and forensic
psychiatry, where their medical expertise and prognosis
become embedded within a legal framework, and non-
medical or non-therapeutic considerations come into
play. Participants also discussed different settings foren-
sic practitioners can work in, ranging from outpatient
care, to providing mental health care in prison, to spe-
cialized long term residental secure care, and how these
different settings influence the degree to which they are
able to assert their medical authority.
Perhaps that is specific to forensic psychiatry, that
this power [to extend imprisonment] does not
come to lie with you, but that you are able to
function within a kind of triangular relationship.
But that also entails that you must be able to
tolerate that someone else is watching along.
And that is different compared to a dialogue in
regular psychiatry. Perhaps therein lays the
uniqueness of forensic psychiatry. Interviewer: In
this third factor? Interviewee: Yes. FP11
I have also worked in prison, there you have
nothing to say. That is a prison, it is the warden
who calls the shots. It is not a medically protected
domain, with a healthcare logic. So we, as
healthcare professionals, can build in safety – but
it has to be on my own territory. FP2
Discussion
Forensic practitioners’ views on potential moral dimen-
sions of forensic psychiatric treatment and care are
highly diverse, as these interviews show. Whereas sev-
eral practitioners rejected the idea that stimulating moral
development or moral growth is or should be part of
forensic psychiatric treatment, other practitioners ap-
peared to be more open to reflecting on potential ele-
ments of stimulating moral development in their work
J. Specker et al.80
practice. And although current forensic practices do not
(explicitly) seek the moral development and moral
growth of forensic patients, elements of stimulating
moral development and moral growth might be part of
forensic psychiatric care implicitly, as this study sug-
gests. Yet, forensic psychiatric treatment is hardly ever
discussed in those terms. As discussed in the discussion,
forensic experts Pearce and Pickard argue that psychia-
try is both a moral and a medical science, and that a
convenient blindness to the moral content of psychiatry
opens the door to potential abuse [5]. They conclude that
our best defence against abuse in forensic psychiatry is
honesty and ever-vigilant self-reflection.
In general, the forensic practitioners we interviewed
appear to be cautious about moralizing and imposing
particular moral views and values, and often stress the
importance of a professional, clinical stance to counter
this. In line with this, Marga Reimer mentions that it is
widely agreed that moral judgment should play no role
in the practice of medicine due to its capacity to impair
clinical judgements and especially so in the case of
psychiatric conditions [12].
Participants identified and discussed a range of mor-
ally relevant aspects that are or potentially can be ad-
dressed in the context of forensic psychiatric treatment,
ranging from stimulating empathetic concern, improv-
ing cognitive skills and correcting cognitions, strength-
ening protective factors to prevent recidivism, to lower-
ing risk factors for future problem behaviour. Future
research might study in a more systematic manner
whether there is a relation between what respondents
understand morality to be with their views on the ap-
propriateness of stimulating moral growth in treatment.
Participants mentioned different potential objectives
for stimulating moral development and moral growth in
treatment: to treat mental disorders and alleviate suffer-
ing of their patient, and/ or to reduce the risk of
reoffending and prevent future harm to others. Our study
suggests that forensic practitioners are both security-
oriented (in terms of risk reduction and recidivism pre-
vention) and concerned about patient care, with some
individuals focusing more strongly on the care aspect
and others more strongly on the security aspect. Several
participants discussed the importance of maintaining a
clinical stance and relying primarily on their medical
expertise and patient-centred responsibilities, although
most practitioners also discussed their role in promoting
public safety, as well as potential tensions between these
two responsibilities.
Professionals working in forensic psychiatric mental
health care are said to indeed have diverse, and poten-
tially conflicting, roles and duties, as they need to bal-
ance responsibilities towards patients (individual of-
fenders), towards the legal system, and towards broader
society [13]. Yet, this study also indicates that a clear
code of ethics on how to manage potential tensions
between promoting public safety on the one hand and
the wellbeing of individual offenders on the other hand
is largely lacking.2
Professionals may encounter a range of ethical con-
flicts between these two roles or sets of tasks, often
discussed in terms of a ‘dual role’, ‘dual relationship’,
or ‘dual loyalty’ dilemma [14–16]. This dilemma is
discussed, first and foremost, in the context of debates
about potential conflicts between a psychiatrist’s duties
as ‘healer/caretaker’ and as ‘evaluator’, for example in
the USA when forensic psychiatrists are involved in
evaluations that may lead to administration of the death
penalty [15]. In other legislations, for example in the
UK, a similar conflict may occur when a forensic psy-
chiatrist’s evaluation of dangerousness may lead to a
person’s pre-emptive detention. Also in treatment con-
texts, individual forensic practitioners may face the eth-
ical demands of two roles, one prioritizing the needs and
interests of the community, the other the (medical and
therapeutic) needs and interests of the offender [14].
Choice and consent, for example to consent to or
refuse treatment, is particularly complex in a secure
psychiatric care context, as Gwen Adhead and Teresa
Davies discuss: BThere is a sense in which the medica-
tion is fulfilling a penal role in reducing the risk of re-
offending, in addition to the therapeutic role. Patients
may not be allowed to refuse to take medication if
professionals think that taking medication will reduce
their risk^ [17]. Sex offender therapy might serve as an
example here. According to forensic psychiatrist Bill
Glaser, sex offender therapy should be characterized as
treatment-as-punishment rather than treatment of the
punished, for the reason that Bthis type of therapy does
not have the interests of the offender as its primary
focus^ [18, 19]. Glaser advocates that in a treatment
2 BIf there are different ethical codes or systems of norms available to
guide offender assessment and treatment, it could be hard to agree on a
subsequent course of action. One forensic expert might justify his or
her actions by appealing to obligations to the court while another could
refer to the needs of patients or offenders, and an obligation to ease
suffering whenever possible. The problem of ethical incommensura-
bility raises its head here.^ [14]
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context, it should be made clear to offenders that the
goals of treatment not always coincide with their own
interests, as this satisfies the requirements of both min-
imizing distress (caused by otherwise deceitful disguis-
ing of the true purpose of treatment) and promoting
equality (by providing offenders with the same amount
of knowledge regarding treatment goals as that pos-
sessed by therapists) [18]. Although evidence about
the effectiveness of pharmacological agents in treating
sex offenders is inconclusive [20, 21], Daniel Turner
and colleagues nevertheless discuss that Bclinical expe-
rience suggests that, for some paraphilic patients, med-
ication is a useful addition to psychotherapeutic inter-
ventions and, as such, its use is being recommended by
both clinicians and the WFSBP [World Federation of
Societies of Biological Psychiatry] guidelines^ [22, 23].
Adshead and Davies also argue that forensic patients
should be included in the medical decision-making as
much as possible to avoid feelings of humiliation, de-
spair, emotional isolation and stigmatization and to
stimulate the long-term recovery of patients [17]. Fo-
rensic practitioners and forensic patients need to be able
to rely on each other for support and safety. This may
include that forensic psychiatrists at times where pa-
tients are unable to make fully competent decision sup-
port patients in the decision-making process to reinstate
full autonomous decision-making on behalf of the pa-
tient and achieve maximal long-term rehabilitation.
Liégois and Eneman similarly argue that shared
decision-making should always be the desired goal
within a psychiatric context [24]. Coercion should never
be self-evident and should always be normatively
defended.
The diversity of ideological and theoretical justifica-
tions of penal strategies and criminal justice institutional
frameworks worldwide (more focused on rehabilitation
versus more focused on retribution) arguably reflect
these same tensions.3 Significant differences exist be-
tween forensic mental health systems globally [26], yet
literature on international comparisons of forensic psy-
chiatric care is scarce [27]. In terms of legal demands,
admission cri ter ia , the concept of cr iminal
responsibility, service provision and treatment philoso-
phy, large differences exist, even between Western Eu-
ropean countries [25, 26, 28, 29]. These differences
between national legislations shape the particular ways
in which forensic practitioners may experience dual role
or dual relationship dilemmas. We urge for more aware-
ness of the historical, ideological and political rationales
behind particular institutional settings. If only because
studies have shown that the context in which health care
takes place, influences and potentially compromises the
provision and ethics of health care [30].
Forensic psychiatrists need to be able to fulfill their
therapeutic role without feeling pressured to give prece-
dence to public safety in ways that harm or are likely to
harm their patients. We agree that although forensic
psychiatry Bcan contribute significantly to the protection
of the public in individual cases, crime prevention can-
not be its primary purpose. In a social climate that places
increasing emphasis on the management of risk, the
pressure to do so is substantial^ [31]. Forensic psychi-
atry as a medical discipline needs to be wary of attempts
to use psychiatry as a means to impose the state’s
interests on the lives of offenders.
Several authors have linked the treatment of of-
fenders, especially with neuro-biological interventions,
to the debate on moral enhancement. In this debate, the
main question is whether biomedical interventions that
enhance prosocial tendencies and emotions and/or in-
hibit anti-social tendencies and emotions may – or
should – be used to improve morality and moral con-
duct, in order to solve pressing societal problems such as
crime and violence, or even terrorism and climate
change. Commentators have discussed the use of
neuro-interventions for offenders or forensic patients
who are suffering from various cognitive, motivational
and emotional impairments as examples of moral
enhancement. As such impairments may involve risk
factors for various kinds of immoral behaviour (e.g.,
sexual crimes, violence, racism), proponents argue
that moral bioenhancement could provide new ways
to achieve successful recidivism reduction and reha-
bilitation [32, 33].
Several commentators in this debate, including the
present authors, have discussed whether psychiatric
treatments that address neurobiological risk factors for
deviant behaviour should indeed be understood as prop-
er instances of moral enhancement [34–36]. Discussing
the treatment of forensic mental health disorders in
terms of the overall practice of moral enhancement
3 A recent comparison of forensic psychiatric care in England, Germa-
ny and The Netherlands confirms the presence of the dual role or dual
relationship dilemma in Western European contexts: BClearly, all three
countries are in the process of significant challenges and changes in
care provision reflecting the tensions between the two key values of
forensic psychiatry: Care for the individual and protection of the
public^ [25].
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might have undesirable consequences. One potential
negative consequence of doing so might be that framing
forensic mental health treatment as ‘mere’ moral en-
hancement could bring the public to disregard the seri-
ousness of the mental health problems forensic patients
may face [37]. Even more problematic is the possibility
that conceptualizing certain risky, invasive and non-
voluntary forensic interventions under the umbrella of
moral enhancement could inadvertedly promote the ac-
ceptance of criminal justice practices that are ethically
troubling. Examples of which would be coerced drug
and/or hormonal treatments that may involve very seri-
ous side effects and/or affect an individual’s mental
liberty [38].
Nevertheless, outspoken proponents such as Ingmar
Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that a number
of psychiatric disorders can be characterized as Bmoral
defects^, and therefore, that treating these disorders
should indeed be understood as moral enhancement:
BThe opposite of promoting another’s interests is
damaging another’s interests. Traits which in-
crease harm to others cause immoral behaviour.
The paradigm is psychopathic personality disor-
der, but other personality disorders such as antiso-
cial personality disorders, borderline personality
disorder and narcissistic personality disorder can
cause great harm to those who come into contact
with these individuals. The reduction in these
tendencies are thus moral enhancements^ [39].
Likewise, David DeGrazia has characterized the treat-
ment (or prevention) of antisocial personality disorder as
a uncontroversial example of moral enhancement [40],
and Thomas Douglas has discussed Binstitutions of
criminal justice’^ as institutions that are arguably
Balready engaged in a kind of moral enhancement^ [41].
A reason in favour of discussing certain aspects of
forensic psychiatric care practices in the context of the
debate on moral enhancement is therefore that it enables
explicit debate on moral dimensions of forensic psychi-
atric care practices, and fosters professional dialogue
and transparency. As Wiseman notes:
if we are already getting moral enhancement by
proxy, and this is to some extent inevitable, the
best solution may be to drag the whole thing out
into the open and critically inspect the process in
the full light of day. If some forms of medical and
mental health treatments will always have morally
related aspects or societal judgments embedded
within them, let us make these judgments explicit
and attempt to find some way of integrating them
within an acceptable code of practice – something
which ensures that the therapeutic context is ap-
propriately person-centered in nature and
nonreductive, and that the healthcare profes-
sionals involved are appropriately directed and
sufficiently well-armed against the dangers raised
above [42].
Moreover, the moral enhancement debate has proceeded
without much attention for the specific institutional
contexts in which potential moral enhancement inter-
ventions will be implemented. By exploring views of
forensic practitioners on elements of moral development
and moral growth in current practices, we hope to open
up space for discussion about where and how ‘moral
enhancement’ may – or may not – be brought into
practice. Without adhering to the view that treatment
of psychiatric disorders should be understood as moral
enhancement, this exploration of views on potential
moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric care can, in
our view, inform the debate on moral enhancement.
In conclusion, we would submit that: (i) Elements
of stimulating moral development and moral growth
in forensic psychiatric care practices are to a certain
extent inevitable and not necessarily questionable or
undesirable; (ii) yet, as in similar debates, these ele-
ments need to be made explicit in order to discuss the
accompanying ethical challenges and boundaries.
The history of concepts like deviance and mental
disorder has led to a wide array of Bmuddled con-
cepts, systems, values, and priorities^ within current
psychiatry [43]. There is a need for philosophical
reflection on the aims of criminal justice and how
these relate to forensic psychiatric practices. How far
should the authority of the legal system extend within
forensic psychiatric practices and how should psychi-
atrists approach and deal with the ethical difficulties
that are specific to their field? Without such reflec-
tions, forensic practitioners risk having to navigate a
Bmoral minefield^ [43]. Especially in view of the
growing interest in neurobiological interventions, an
open academic, professional and public debate on the
(un)desirability of stimulating moral development
and moral growth within current practices is there-
fore needed.
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